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The Possibility of a Fair Paretian
Howard F. Changt
In my preceding article, I respond to the claim that the weak Pareto
principle implies welfarism.' Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell make this
claim in a series of recent papers.' In my article, I have consistently adopted
the definition of welfarism that is standard among social choice theorists.3
Under this standard definition, welfarism "restricts the information that can
be utilized in ranking social states to utility information corresponding to
those social states."' 4 In their prior writings, Kaplow and Shavell have
indicated that they intend to refer to this same concept They contrast
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1. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare. Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000).
2. Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, ANY NON-INDIVIDUALISTIC SOCIAL WELFARE
FUNCTION VIOLATES THE PARETO PRINCIPLE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7051, 1999),forthcoming as Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of
Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, 109 J. POL. ECON. (2001) [hereinafter KAPLOW
& SHAVELL, NON-INDIVIDUALISTIC]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between
Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle, I AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63 (1999) [hereinafter
Kaplow & Shavell, Conflict]; Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS
VERSUS HUMAN WELFARE: ON THE EVALUATION OF LEGAL POLICY 44 (John M. Olin Ctr. for
Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 277, 2000),forthcoming in 114
HARV. L. REV. (2001) [hereinafter KAPLOW & SI4AVELL, HUMAN WELFARE].
3. E.g., Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463, 468 (1979) (defining
"welfarism" as the view that "[t]he judgment of the relative goodness of alternative states of
affairs must be based exclusively on, and taken as an increasing function of, the respective
collections of individual utilities in these states").
4. ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 143 (1984). Social choice
theorists also use the term "strong neutrality" to refer to this concept. Id.
5. They express this concept in the same algebraic form in each of their papers. KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, NON-INDIVIDUALISTIC, supra note 2, at 2; Kaplow & Shavell, Conflict, supra note 2,
at 66 n.5; KAPLOW & SHAVELL, HUMAN WELFARE, supra note 2, at 20 n.31. In each paper, their
algebraic expression indicates that social welfare is a function of only individual utility; no other
variable appears as an argument in the social welfare function.
An ambiguity arises when Kaplow and Shavell, without making explicit any further
assumptions, assert as an "observation" that their notion of welfarism is equivalent to the Pareto
indifference rule. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, NON-INDIVIDUALISTIC, supra note 2, at 2. Welfarism, as
social choice theorists use the term, however, is not equivalent to the Pareto indifference rule
unless one makes "quite demanding" assumptions. Chang, supra note 1, at 222 n. 193; Amartya
Sen, Social Choice Theory, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 1073, 1155
(Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds., 1986). In their reply, Kaplow and Shavell state
that if the Pareto indifference rule applies, then "there is no sense in which the notion of fairness
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welfarist theories with notions of "fairness," which "are based, at least in
part, on factors unrelated to individuals' well-being" such that "knowledge
of the effects of a legal rule on each individual's well-being will not
generally be sufficient to assess the fairness of the rule." 6 Kaplow and
Shavell use the terms "well-being" and "utility" as synonyms.7 They claim
that "any conceivable notion of social welfare that does not depend solely
on individuals' utilities" will sometimes violate the Pareto principle.'
In my article, I show that this claim, expressed without qualification, as
Kaplow and Shavell state it, is false. I present a "conceivable notion of
social welfare that does not depend solely on individual utilities" that
complies with the Pareto principle. Under either F* or F**, the rankings of
alternatives will depend on information other than individual utilities. This
fairness information may include, for example, the source of the utility
produced by each alternative, which would be relevant if our fairness
criterion F is liberal consequentialism.9 This information is necessary under
F* or F**, because the rankings under each theory require the identification
of the fairness optimum to partition the set of alternatives. If we change the
fairness information corresponding to each alternative, then even if the
utility information corresponding to each alternative remains unchanged,
the fairness optimum changes, and thus so do our rankings.'0 Therefore, the
rankings are a function of information other than individuals' utilities.
Thus, contrary to the claim in the title of one of their forthcoming
pieces, Kaplow and Shavell do not show that "Any Non-Welfarist Method
of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle."" They do not (and
is receiving any independent weight." Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness
Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237, 241 n.10
(2000). This statement, however, is true only in the context in which everyone is indifferent
between the alternatives in question. The premise that fairness information is irrelevant in that
particular context does not imply that fairness information is irrelevant outside that context. Thus,
Kaplow and Shavell cannot derive welfarism from the Pareto indifference rule without also
assuming that an independence condition applies over an unrestricted domain. See BOADWAY &
BRUCE, supra note 4, at 143-44; Sen, supra, at 1122.
6. Kaplow & Shavell, Conflict, supra note 2, at 65; see KAPLOW & SHAVELL, HUMAN
WELFARE, supra note 2, at 35 ("Notions of fairness have the property that evaluations relying on
them are not based exclusively... on how legal policies affect individuals' well-being.").
7. Kaplow & Shavell, Conflict, supra note 2, at 66 n.5.
8. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, NON-INDIVIDUALISTIC, supra note 2, at 1.
9. A welfarist theory must ignore such information. BOADWAY & BRUCE, supra note 4, at
143 (noting that under welfarism, "information about how the utility levels are obtained is
irrelevant for determining how the social states should be ordered").
10. Suppose, for example, we want to rank two alternatives, x and y, neither of which Pareto-
dominates the other. If fairness information indicates that x is the unique fairness optimum under
F, then both F* and F** would rank x over y. If, however, fairness information indicates instead
that y is the unique fairness optimum, then both F* and F** would rank y over x, even if the utility
information regarding the alternatives is unchanged.
11. LOuIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, ANY NON-WELFARIST METHOD OF POLICY
ASSESSMENT VIOLATES THE PARETO PRINCIPLE (Harvard Law Sch., Public Law and Legal
Theory Working Paper No. 3, 1999) (revised draft of KAPLOW & SHAVELL, NON-
INDIVIDUALISTIC, supra note 2),forthcoming in 109 J. POL. ECON. (2001).
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indeed, as I have shown, cannot) show that "any" such theory violates the
Pareto principle. They show only that some non-welfarist theories violate
the Pareto principle. In particular, they can show only that non-welfarist
theories that comply with independence and continuity conditions over an
unrestricted domain must violate the Pareto principle.12
In their reply to my article, Kaplow and Shavell deny that either F* or
F** is "a Pareto-conflict-free notion that is not solely based on individuals'
well-being." 13 The basis for their claim is obscure, but Kaplow and Shavell
apparently seek to expand their definition of welfarism to include F* and
F** and accordingly add new restrictions to their definition of fairness. In
their reply, Kaplow and Shavell suggest for the first time that their notion of
welfarism would allow rankings to depend on more information than just
individual utility levels. First, they assert that rankings under their
framework could depend on information about individuals, so that social
choices "could give more to Joe because he is tall and less to Jill because
her preferences are objectionable." 4 Even assuming that the definition of
welfarism allows such information about the characteristics of individuals
to be morally relevant, this concession is still insufficient to bring F* and
F** within the definition. If F is liberal consequentialism, for example, then
F* and F** require not information about individuals but rather information
about the effect of each alternative on the type of utility enjoyed by each
individual. Under either F* or F**, it is insufficient to know that Jill has
objectionable preferences. We must also know the degree to which each
alternative satisfies her personal preferences.
Perhaps Kaplow and Shavell now intend to include such information
about alternatives within their framework. They suggest, for example, that
they do not intend to include any fairness regarding distribution in their
definition of fairness. 5 In their prior writing, however, they exclude only
"some" distributive concerns, namely those based "solely on individuals'
well-being." 6 They contrast these welfarist concerns with "theories
bearing on the just distribution of income . .. not based solely on
12. Each condition is necessary for the weak Pareto principle to imply welfarism. If we relax
the requirement of continuity, for example, then we can add a fairness principle as a tiebreaker to
an otherwise welfarist theory. The result is a fair Paretian theory that complies with independence
conditions. Similarly, if we relax the requirement of independence, then we can produce a fair
Paretian theory of social welfare that is continuous in individual utilities. Consider a theory that
produces standard downward-sloping social indifference curves in utility space. This theory of
social welfare would be both continuous and Paretian. If we make the shape and position of these
curves in utility space a function of fairness information, however, as the shape and position of the
partitions under F* or F** are, then the underlying theory of social welfare is a fairness theory.
13. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 246.
14. Id. at 237 n.2.
15. Id. at 246 n.24.
16. Kaplow & Shavell, Conflict, supra note 2, at 67 (citing the theory that "marginal utility
of income is greater for the poor" as an example of an idea "based only on individuals' well-
being"); see also, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAvELL, HUMAN WELFARE, supra note 2, at 24-26.
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individuals' well-being," which "can be shown sometimes to... conflict
with the Pareto principle." " Indeed, they claim specifically that their
formal proof of a conflict between the Pareto principle and fairness
"encompasses distributive theories that are not based only on individuals'
utilities" as subject to their claim. 8 Thus, because the distributive fairness
in F* and F** is based not only on individuals' utilities but also on other
information, they are among the fairness theories supposedly subject to
their claim regarding a conflict with the Pareto principle.
Kaplow and Shavell can bring F* and F** within their definition of
welfarism only by modifying that definition to allow in any fairness
information that can affect the distribution of utility. After all, the fairness
criterion F could give weight to any fairness notion criticized by Kaplow
and Shavell, including corrective justice and retributive justice.19 I gave
liberal consequentialism as only one example of a fairness theory F. If F
instead is a theory that gives weight to notions like retribution and
corrective justice, then so will F* and F**, which make the fairness
optimum under F relevant for ranking alternatives. Thus, F* and F** would
allow in considerations that Kaplow and Shavell specifically seek to
exclude from our analysis of legal rules. If they seek to define welfarism
this broadly, then they have departed radically from the standard definition
and left themselves with a notion of welfarism with little content. 20 Given
that they cite the Pareto principle in support of their sweeping attack on all
such fairness notions,2' their readers may be surprised to find out that
Kaplow and Shavell now agree that giving weight to all these notions in
functions like F* and F** is in fact consistent with the Pareto principle.
That is, regardless of what Kaplow and Shavell mean by "welfarism," my
article demonstrates that the Pareto principle by itself cannot provide
support for their general recommendation that legal policy should be
evaluated using a framework "under which assessments of policies depend
exclusively on their effects on individuals' well-being." 22
17. Kaplow & Shavell, Conflict, supra note 2, at 67 n.9.
18. Id (citing KAPLOW & SHAVELL, NON-INDIVIDUALISTIC, supra note 2).
19. Id. at 70-71.
20. The concept that remains, which apparently includes F* and F** as well as utilitarianism,
would seem to be mere Paretianism. If so, then Kaplow and Shavell's claim reduces to a
tautology: The Pareto principle implies the Pareto principle.
21. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, HUMAN WELFARE, supra note 2, at 44.
22. Id. at 454. Presumably for this reason, Kaplow and Shavell state in their reply that
allowing any distributive principle into their definition of welfarism violates "the spirit of some of
our arguments." Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 237 n.2. This statement leaves unclear
precisely what they mean to include in their notion of welfarism.
In their reply, Kaplow and Shavell also invoke their "symmetric case," which they claim is
"by itself sufficient to establish that there is a conflict between any notion of fairness and the
Pareto principle." id. at 239 (emphasis added). This case, however, at most demonstrates a
potential conflict between a crude fairness principle like F and the Pareto principle. Under either
F* or F**, if all individuals in the world were somehow to find themselves in this imaginary
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To derive this position from the Pareto principle, Kaplow and Shavell
must make continuity and independence assumptions that are themselves
controversial.23 In their reply, they seek to defend these assumptions as
requirements for "logical consistency." 24 Neither axiom, however, is
logically required.
Kaplow and Shavell criticize the discontinuity implied by F* or F** by
noting that "no matter how much unfairness is involved, it can be
outweighed by the tiniest amount of administrative cost savings."25 Under
F* or F**, however, costs would trump unfairness only in the context of a
Pareto improvement, when everyone would agree to waive their right to the
fairness optimum. Alienable rights to fairness imply that neither F* nor F**
would give any weight to unfairness, regardless "how much" unfairness is
at stake, if everyone prefers to override fairness concerns. As long as the
Pareto principle is not at stake, however, fairness concerns would trump
any welfarist concern.
Similarly, Kaplow and Shavell declare that violations of independence
are "absurd," but offer little reason for the reader to agree.26 Theories like
F* and F** violate independence because they take alienable rights to
fairness seriously. In Sen's example,27 these theories would give P the right
not to read a book (that is, we would choose o over p), unless he waives this
right. Whether P chooses to waive this right may in turn depend on whether
an alternative like I (in which L reads the book) is feasible, because I would
be the fairness optimum, so that L can credibly threaten to make 1 our social
choice.28 If the feasibility of I implies that P would agree to alternative p,
symmetric case, they could unanimously agree to waive their rights to the fairness optimum under
F. This demonstration does not prevent a Paretian from applying fairness principles in the real
world, in which individuals do not find themselves in that symmetric setting. Thus, I question the
relevance of this hypothetical and the conclusions that Kaplow and Shavell seek to draw from it.
See Chang, supra note 1, at 190 n.69.
23. Kaplow and Shavell seek to distinguish their independence assumption from that of
Kenneth Arrow by noting that their assumption does not share all of the controversial features of
Arrow's. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 243 n.17. Like Arrow's assumption, however,
Kaplow and Shavell's assumption includes the controversial feature of "pairwise choice," which
"means that in socially ranking any pair of candidates a device cannot respond to information
about other candidates." ALFRED F. MACKAY, ARROW'S THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL
CHOICE 93 (1980). Theorists have questioned this particular aspect of Arrow's assumption. Id. at
92 (noting that pairwise choice "does not appear to have much intrinsically to recommend it");
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 394 (1989) (questioning the "normative value" of the
assumption that "'social choices made in pairwise comparisons"' should determine "'the entire
social ordering' (quoting KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 28
(2d ed. 1963))).
24. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 238.
25. Id. at 242.
26. Id. at 244.
27. See Chang, supra note 1, at 196-98 (citing Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian
Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 155 (1970)).
28. The feasibility of the third alternative would be relevant only if it represents a fairness
optimum (like 1) and thus represents an alternative to which individuals are entitled. Only then
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then we would rank p above o as long as I is a feasible alternative.29 1 leave
it to the reader to decide whether this respect for alienable rights, which
makes the feasibility of third alternatives morally relevant, is "absurd," as
Kaplow and Shavell claim."0
Kaplow and Shavell also complain that a procedure like F** would
require an infinite number of steps to generate the modified rankings." This
feature of F**, however, is not necessary to prove the possibility of a fair
Paretian. Other counterexamples to Kaplow and Shavell's claim do not
require an infinite number of steps to complete. 2 Furthermore, one would
would the alternative be a credible threat as a social choice that would induce individuals to waive
their rights to object to a Pareto superior alternative (like p).
Nevertheless, Kaplow and Shavell complain that the feasibility of alternatives may be costly
to determine or may be influenced by the expenditures of individuals. Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 5, at 244-45. Theories like F* or F**, however, could take these costs into account. For
example, if L can credibly threaten to make I feasible, say, by learning the language used in the
book in question, then I is already feasible in the relevant sense. Thus, if everyone prefers that we
choose p rather than requiring L to make I feasible (because it would not be chosen anyway), then
under F* or F** we would do so.
Similarly, the decision to investigate the feasibility of I would itself be a social choice. Under
liberal consequentialism, the cost of this investigation would itself be morally relevant. First, an
individual like L, who is entitled to the alternative in question if it is feasible, would be entitled to
this investigation only if it is not too costly compared with the expected increase in the
satisfaction of personal preferences under 1. Second, if the feasibility of I is so likely that everyone
would prefer to choose p without an investigation of I's feasibility, then under F* or F** we
would do so.
29. Thus I suggest that our ranking of a pair of feasible alternatives may depend on the
feasibility of a third alternative. I also criticize the suggestion that the infeasibility of a
hypothetical alternative implies that it would not be desirable if it were feasible. Chang, supra
note 1, at 202. Kaplow and Shavell's reply to my article confuses these two distinct suggestions
regarding the moral relevance of feasibility. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 243-44 & n.19.
30. To support their claim, Kaplow and Shavell offer a hypothetical that supposedly
illustrates the problems raised by violations of the independence condition. Id. at 245 n.21. Their
example, however, is disturbing only because it assumes an unreasonable fairness theory, one that
gives "Bill, the richest... person in the society," the right to veto a move that would alleviate the
"misery" of "every other person," who is "on the brink of starvation." Id. Here Kaplow and
Shavell attack a straw man; they derive an unreasonable result by making an unreasonable
assumption. A reasonable fairness theory, like liberal consequentialism, would make "starvation"
of so many people morally relevant in the determination of the fairness optimum. Bill, like
everyone else in society, would be entitled to the fairness optimum, which would consider the
personal preferences of everyone, not to the "starvation" regime described by Kaplow and
Shavell.
31. Id. at 246. They further claim that F** is "impossible," because if we assign "real
numbers" to the ranks under F, and the ranks fully occupy the real line, then there is no room left
on the real line to allow the creation of more ranks. Id. at 246 & n.25. They incorrectly assume,
however, that the creation of more ranks requires the assignment of new numbers on the real line.
Consider, for example, the addition of a tiebreaking rule, which can create new ranks
notwithstanding the fact that the old ranks fully occupied the real line. The "leximin" rule, for
example, multiplies ranks through the use of such tiebreakers. Chang, supra note 1, at 225 n.198.
Similarly, under F**, we can replace rank 10 with ranks 10a, 10b, and 10c. We can transfer the
alternatives remaining in rank 10 to rank 10b, place alternatives that rank higher than 10 but lower
than any higher rank in 10a, and place alternatives that rank lower than 10 but higher than any
lower rank in 10c.
32. For example, if we find the possibility of infinite iterations in theory to be a disturbing
prospect, then we can replace step (4) of F** with the following: "(4a) To rank alternatives within
these newly created sets, apply a welfarist principle." The resulting theory would still be a
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have to perform an infinite number of steps under F** only in theory. In
practice, given the costliness of gathering and analyzing information, for
reasons explained in my article, a belief in F** is almost certain to imply
the same choices one would make under the "crude" fairness theory F.33
Thus, the practical implications of F** suggest that the Pareto principle
requires very little change from the social choices we would make under
criterion F. 4 This implication of F** makes it all the more surprising that
Kaplow and Shavell now seek to embrace this theory within their definition
of welfarism, because F** undermines their claim that the Pareto principle
implies that we should ignore the many fairness principles that may enter
criterion F.
Finally, Kaplow and Shavell ask "what criteria" we should use to
launder preferences in a theory like liberal consequentialism.35 I believe that
the question of precisely what theory of preference laundering we should
embrace is an important issue that is well worth exploring further in the
future.3" I do not need to defend any particular answer to this question,
fairness theory, because it would still require fairness information in step (1). That is, the fairness
optimum under F would remain the presumptive social optimum, which could be trumped only by
a Pareto improvement and not by any other alternative favored by a welfarist theory.
33. Chang, supra note 1, at 230-32. I argue that given the constraints imposed by scarce
resources, the constrained optimum under F* or F** is likely to be the fairness optimum under F.
In their reply, Kaplow and Shavell question this proposed focus on the fairness optimum under F,
basing their critique on the incorrect assumption that this optimum must be "identified in a
literally perfect, precise manner." Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 247 n.26. A fairness
criterion F like liberal consequentialism would take the costs of policy analysis into account in
selecting the social optimum. Thus, one would maximize F only as best one could given the
scarcity of resources. In support of their claim, Kaplow and Shavell cite the fact that F* and F**
violate continuity and independence. Id. at 247. These features of F* and F** would not be
relevant to the identification of the fairness optimum under F. If F is liberal consequentialism,
then it could satisfy Kaplow and Shavell's continuity and independence assumptions.
34. As Kaplow and Shavell note, "in reality, it will rarely be the case that one legal rule will
literally make everyone better off than will another legal rule." Kaplow & Shavell, Conflict, supra
note 2, at 72.
35. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 248. Kaplow and Shavell ask, for example, about
"external preferences that have socially desirable effects," such as "disapprobation" that "deters
individuals from improper behavior." Id. These effects, however, merely suggest that we may
wish to encourage these external preferences for their instrumental value in promoting the
satisfaction of personal preferences. It does not follow that we should count the satisfaction of
these external preferences as instrinsically valuable components of social welfare.
Kaplow and Shavell also criticize my use of the term "instrinsically immoral" as
conclusory. Id. at 248 n.28 (quoting Chang, supra note 1, at 189 n.67). The footnote that they
quote, however, uses that term as a conclusion only after first explaining the distinctiwon between
"purely self-regarding preferences" and "inherently discriminatory preferences" such as "'those
reflecting overt racial hostility' or "'racially selective sympathy."' Chang, supra note 1, at 189
n.67 (quoting Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1976)).
36. For example, is the sadist's pleasure of "seeing ... victims suffer" a personal preference
that ought to count? Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 248 n.28. To the extent that this sadist's
preferences require that the victims actually suffer, however, this pleasure derives from an
external preference. The component that is purely personal could be satisfied by actors pretending
to suffer. Thus, the pleasure of seeing a snuff film would be objectionable, but the pleasure of
seeing violence depicted using actors and special effects would not. In any event, I am open to
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however, to disprove Kaplow and Shavell's claim regarding the Pareto
principle. My counterexample is sufficient to prove the possibility of a fair
Paretian regardless of what theory of preference laundering one may use to
construct the fairness criterion F. Although I have offered some views on
preference laundering, the identification of the ideal fairness theory is an
achievement that I do not claim to have accomplished.
Kaplow and Shavell also ask "who gets to choose" which preferences
we launder.7 One can just as easily ask who gets to decide the right answer
to any moral or political question. Who decides whether to embrace
welfarism or fairness theories? If we all endorse welfarism, then who
decides which welfarist theory to embrace? 8 The answer is that we each
decide the answer to these questions, as individuals engaged in the process
of moral reasoning. We can seek to persuade one another of one theory or
another, but ultimately we all must make such judgments for ourselves.39 In
this spirit, I have presented a liberal theory of social welfare for the reader's
consideration. I offer it as only one option on the menu of theories from
which the reader may choose, depending on the reader's own moral
intuitions.
arguments that there may exist some personal preferences that ought not to count. I have only
criticized the suggestion that we must "exclude all personal preferences that derive from moral or
political views." Chang, supra note 1, at 194 (emphasis added).
37. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 248.
38. Although Kaplow and Shavell endorse welfarism, they do not defend any particular
functional form for the social welfare function.
39. Perhaps Kaplow and Shavell mean to ask what legal and political institutions we should
erect in order to make social choices. These issues, such as what constitution, what rights for
individuals against the government, what democratic procedures, and what rules for judicial
review we should adopt, are questions that each individual must answer according to that
individual's moral and political beliefs. How to make social choices in the absence of any
consensus on moral and political philosophies is itself a problem that we each must consider
according to our own moral and political principles. Each of us may endorse the same electoral
processes or doctrines of judicial restraint using entirely different moral and political theories.
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